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ALL MONICA, ALL OF THE TIME: THE 24-HOUR NEWS
CYCLE AND THE PROOF OF CULPABILITY IN LIBEL
ACTIONS
David A. Logan*
A confluence of unprecedented forces is reshaping the context in
which contemporary journalists work. First is the explosion of sources
of information spawned by the arrival of cable TV and especially the
Internet.' Second is a pervasive emphasis on the bottom line, in part due
to the rapid concentration of media outlets, with corporate managers
insisting that news divisions become profit centers.' These forces have
created the "24-hour news cycle," a beast with a voracious appetite for
both quantity of "content" and speed of delivery that pressures journal-
ists to get the news first and fast, rather than first and right.'
This essay contains three parts. Part I traces the history of the 24-
hour news cycle. Part II surveys the impact of these developments on
newsgathering and reporting and critiques media coverage of the
Monica Lewinsky/Bill Clinton affair. Part III considers how this
changed landscape should influence the law, specifically, the requisite
proof of culpability in a libel action. At present, decisional law appears
to lower the amount of care expected of a journalist who is faced with
a deadline. I argue that in a world characterized by the 24-hour news
cycle, ajournalist who insists on publishing a story in response to a self-
imposed deadline, and who justifies this by pointing to the evolving
journalistic custom to publish first and verify later, should be held to
have assumed some risk that the resulting story may contain misstate-
ments of fact, and that in any subsequent libel action the journalist
should not be able to use that deadline as an excuse for inaccurate
reporting, at least in claims brought by private plaintiffs.
I. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE 24-HOUR NEWS CYCLE
Once upon a time, not so long ago, Americans got their news from
a handful of sources. Most news came via the daily newspaper, and in
larger markets, there was a choice from among a handful of newspapers,
available in the morning and evening. Many of these papers were
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. Thanks to Ron Wright and Wayne
Logan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. See infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
3. See Alicia C. Shepard, The Incredible Shrinking News Cycle, WORLD & 1, June
1998, at 80.
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owned and operated by powerful families, who mixed a desire to turn
a profit with a commitment to improving the life of their communities."
Daily papers had up to 24 hours to reach conclusions about the veracity
and, just as importantly, the significance of the stories that might be
reported. On the print side, there were also the weekly mass circulation
newsmagazines, primary among them Time, Newsweek, and US News,
which had the luxury of up to a week's time to research and write the
news.
5
A. The Emergence of CNN
In the 1970s, Americans increasingly got their news from broadcast
media, especially television, and tens of millions tuned into the evening
broadcasts of the three networks. Then, in 1980, came an upstart, the
Cable News Network, which provided around-the-clock news. CNN
labored in relative anonymity (at least outside the Beltway) until the
Persian Gulf War in 1991. With cameras and reporters perched behind
the battle lines, beaming seventeen uninterrupted hours of live footage
of Coalition munitions lighting up the Baghdad sky, CNN was cata-
pulted into the public's consciousness. This on-the-spot, unscripted
drama riveted notjust American audiences, but, through the miracle of
satellite broadcasting, instantly made CNN the breaking news choice for
the world, including Saddam Hussein.6 CNN garnered the highest
ratings of all the networks during that period and demonstrated that
saturation coverage of public affairs had the potential to be more than
a market niche." CNN's all-news focus has since been replicated by Fox
and MSNBC, with numerous spin-offs!
4. See Marvin Kalb, The Industrialization of the News, NEW PERSP. Q., Fall 1998, at
42.
5. In addition, important information may come from publications that provide
journalists even more time to research, write, and edit a story. The New Yorker's fact-
checking is legendary. See Nat Hentoff, Blurring Nonfiction and Fiction, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, Dec. 21, 1999, at 44.
6. See Arthur Salm, CNN Chief Sees Good Media for the Future, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Aug. 7, 1995, at D6 (reporting that Saddam Hussein watched CNN on one of the
36,000 satellite dishes that his troops looted from Kuwait).
7. See Shepard, supra note 3, at 80. Of course, not all important events garner
large audiences despite the close attention of the media; one need only watch as the
camera pans over an empty Senate chamber and galleries during CSPAN's gavel-to-
gavel coverage of Congress at work.
8. See Ed Burmila, Quantity Over Quality (visited June 30, 2000)
<http://www.uwire.com> (discussing CNBC and CNN's Headline News); Felicity
Barringer, MSNBC.com: The Shape ofJournalism to Come, GREENSBORONEWS& REC., Jan.
10, 2000, at D6 (discussing hybrid news organizations such as MSNBC.com, which
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B. The Impact of the Internet
Perhaps no single invention has so quickly altered so much of our
lives. For both journalists and non-journalists alike, it provides instant
access to up-to-the-minute electronic versions of almost all -magazines
and daily newspapers, as posting news on websites gains publicity for
both the site and the mother publication, as well as a national audience
for its scoops." The Internet also provides access to original documents
and sources, allowing the reader to bypass the filter provided by the
news editor.'" There are even Internet sites that summarize news found
on other Internet sites." Also important are the many sites created
especially for electronic audiences, like Slate and Salon, plus tens of
thousands of web 'zines, newsrooms, and chat groups, where a
keystroke can, in seconds, disseminate a fact or a falsehood to millions
of readers, including reporters. 2 In short, the explosion of available
information has dramatically altered the environment in which reporters
and editors work.
The availability of web pages, 'and the temptation to use them to
post breaking developments, requires editors to make on-the-spot
decisions about whether to report a story or hold for more research, a
challenge familiar to wire services and broadcast outlets, but decidedly
take advantage of the Internet).
9. See Kelly Heyboer, When Posting a Scoop Backfires, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.
1, 1999, at 30. Some of these sites are very successful, with the web sites of the New
York Times and USA Today each attracting millions of visitors daily. See Howard Kurtz,
All Aboard the E-Train: For the Media, the Internet Is the Hottest Thing Since Gutenberg,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1999, at COl.
10. See Leonard Steinhorn, 90s Will Be Known as the 'Decade of the Media',
CINCiNNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 1, 1999, at B4. Similarly, the Internet facilitates "distance
journalism," as reporters are no longer required to physically go to where the sources
of information are. See Wendell Cochran, Journalism's New Geography: How Electronic
Tools Alter the Culture and Practice of Newsgathering, 7 ELECTRONIC J. COM. No. 2, 1997
archived at <http://www.cios.org/www/ejcmain.htm>. Cf The Smoking Gun (visited June
30,2000) <http://www.thesmokinggun.com> (providing electronic access to documents
culled from, inter alia, law enforcement sources, Freedom of Information requests, and
court files).
11. See Ilan Greenberg, Selling News Short, BRILL's CONTENT, Mar. 2000, at 64.
12. See Elizabeth Weise, Does the Internet Change News Reporting? Not Quite, 11
MEDIA STUD. 159 (1997) (detailing how experienced reporter Pierre Salinger held a
press conference toreveal the contents of what he erroneously thought was an official
government document; it in fact was an email that had been widely disseminated, but
was impossible tO trace for veracity). Cf DoubtCome.com (visited June 30, 2000)
<http://www.doubtcome.com/index.html>. DoubtCome is my favorite website; it is a
conspiracy buff's dream, with the slogan "If you doubt, come and say it." Id.
2000]
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unfamiliar to those raised in the culture of the one-deadline-a-day daily
news cycle. 3 Andrew Glass, senior Washington correspondent for Cox
Broadcasting, observed:
In the old days, on the first day we would report what happened. On
the second day, we would tell what the reaction was. On the third
day, we would analyze what it means. Now CNN tells you what
happened and five minutes later some Professor from Fordham
University is telling you what it means .... We have to find a way to
package it all the first day or we're out of business. 4
The merger of entertainment and news has also affected j ournalism.
Concern has grown about the shrinking market share for hard news,
prompted by outlets garnering respectable ratings by focusing on soft
news.15
The shifting business model has also played a role. Traditionally,
the news divisions of broadcast networks were not expected to turn a
profit. Indeed, many were run as loss leaders, while many newspapers
were run by family dynasties with an expressed commitment to missions
beyond profit. Today, news divisions are often considered merely one
of many profit centers in a media conglomerate. The scramble for
ratings and circulation, which form the basis for advertising rates, has
caused both a souping up and a dumbing down of the information
presented. 6 Also contributing to these changes is the fact that fewer and
fewer companies control much of the delivery systems for the world's
information: Time Warner, Disney (ABC's parent), Sony, General
13. See Heyboer, supra note 9.
14. John Herbers & James H. McCartney, The New Washington Merry-Go-Round,
AM. JOURNALISM REv., Apr. 1, 1999" archived at <http://ajr.newslink.org/special/
partl O.html>.
15. See James Fallows, Rush from Judgment, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 1999, at 18.
"Hard news" is information of immediate importance to the public as citizens, while
"soft news" focuses more on culture, people behind the news, business trends, travel,
community events, and "human interest" stories. See Lisa Brown, Note, Dead but Not
Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1525, 1567 n.109 (1989).
16. See id. This is not to say that the media have either a uniform or long history
of serious coverage of hard news. See John H. Fuson, Protecting the Press from Privacy,
148 U. PA. L. REv. 629, 64445 (1999) (tracing the evolution of sensationalistic news
from William Randolph Hearst to Rupert Murdoch). Even de Tocqueville noted the
tendency ofthe American media toward "coarse," market-driven pandering. See ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 168 (G. Lawrence trans., 1966). See also
David A. Logan, 'Stunt Journalism, 'Professional Norms, and Public Mistrust of the Media,
9 U. FLA J.L. & PuB. POLY 151, 166-67 (1998) (tracing the increasing "tabloidization"
of television news).
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Electric (NBC's parent), AT&T, News Corp., Viacom (CBS' parent),
Seagrams, and Bertelsmann, with the recent announcement of AOL's
merger with Time Warner underscoring the potential for both horizontal
and vertical consolidation. 7
Together these changes have created a hypercompetitive environ-
ment and what veteran journalist Marvin Kalb has called "the industrial-
ization of the news."' 8 The next section details the operation of the 24-
hour news cycle by focusing on Monicagate.
II. THE 24-HOUR NEWS CYCLE INACTION
In an important recent book, Warp Speed: America in the Age ofMixed
Media, two experienced journalists, Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel,
evaluate media coverage of the events leading up to the impeachment
of President Bill Clinton. 9 The authors looked closely at a new
environment in which "the cultures of entertainment, infotainment,
argument, analysis, tabloid, and mainstream press not only work side by
side but intermingle and merge,"2 undermining the classic function of
journalism: to "sort out (and present) a true and reliable account of the
day's events."'"
17. See Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve
Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. 551 (2000). See also Robert McChesney, RICH MEDIA,
POOR DEMOCRACY (1999) (providing a critical appraisal of this consolidation); The
Project on Media Ownership (visited Aug. 31, 2000) <http://www.midwestbookseller.
com/guest.html> (tracking the various holdings of media giants). The award-winning
movie The Insider gives a gripping portrayal of the impact of "corporate" upon the
"newsies" in the conglomerate context. See THE INSIDER (Touchstone Pictures 1999).
For a more benign view of the impact of consolidation, see Paul Farhi, HowBadls Big?,
21 AM. JouRNALIsM REV., Dec. 1, 1999, at 28 ("Rather than a conspiracy to dominate
the channels of communications, consolidation and mergers reflect just the opposite:
a corporate class struggling to keep up with a media and cultural landscape that grows
more disheveled, more competitive and more anarchic by the month.").
18. Kalb, supra note 4.
19. BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED
MEDIA (1999) [hereinafter WARP SPEED]. Kovach is curator of the Nieman Foundation
for Journalism at Harvard. See id. Rosenstiel is director of the Project for Excellence
in Journalism at Columbia. See id. Under the auspices of the Committee of Concerned
Journalists, they performed three major content studies of media coverage of the
Clinton scandal and sponsored three public forums involving some of the working
journalists who covered the story. See id. Warp Speed is the result of their efforts. See
id.
20. See id. at 4.
21. See id. at 5.
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This new "Mixed Media Culture," which according to the authors
is replacing "the traditional journalism of verification," has the
following characteristics:'
1. The never-ending news cycle, in which the press is as con-
cerned with ferrying accusations as with ferreting out the
truth23-the cycle is a nonstop multimedia news-talk festival,
in which the need for the content to fill hundreds of hours and
thousands of pages per week triggers the reporting of allega-
tions with neither the traditional concern for verification nor
the time to sort out which stories are important enough to be
reported;
24
2. A race to the ethical bottom, where the lower standards of
what used to be fringe journalism pressure and often prompt
the mainstream press to launch a report or face the prospect of
being viewed as hopelessly behind the curve and suffer an
attendant loss of market share, and thus revenues; 5 and
3. An obsession with reporting the blockbuster, a story that
typically contains large doses of celebrity, sex, and
scandal 26 -these stories provide a short-term boost to market
share and often are cheaper to report and produce than stories
reflecting measured coverage of a diversified menu of news.27
The authors found all of these forces displayed in the coverage of
Monicagate, and media behavior in the first few days of the scandal
exemplify the dangers associated with the 24-hour news cycle. 8
On January 18, 1998, hundreds of journalists around the country
awoke to the Drudge Report, an email from Matt Drudge, a Los Angeles-
based Internet columnist. 9 The "World Exclusive" screamed that
Newsweek had at the last minute killed a story "destined to shake official
22. Id. at 6-8.
23. See id. at 6.
24. See id.
25. See WARP SPEED, supra note 19, at 7.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 5.
29. Drudge already had a reputation for slack fact-checking. See Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do
About It, 73 TuL. L. REv. 173, 181 (1998) (characterizing the Drudge Report as "a
source of instant, largely unedited, and occasionally accurate scandal mongering"). See
also David McClintick, Town Crier for the New Age, BRILL'S CONTENT, Nov. 1998, at 112,
125 (reporting that almost two thirds of Drudge's stories were either false or debatable).
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Washington to its foundation: a White House intern carried on a sexual
affair with the President of the United States!"30 Within hours, Drudge's
scoop was mentioned on ABC-TV's This Week with Sam Donaldson and
Cokie Roberts, and hit mainstream newspapers on January 21, with items
in the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times, attributed to "sources close
to the investigation."'" Flushed out by these events, a frustrated
Newsweek posted its 4,000 word story on its web site.32 ABC, CBS, and
NBC soon followed with reports that someone, but not anyone on their
staffs or anyone they had actually interviewed, had learned of the
President's illicit affair by listening to surreptitiously-obtained tape
recordings of conversations with the intern, Monica Lewinsky.33 Within
twenty four hours, Drudge and Mike Isikoff, the lead Newsweek reporter
on the story, were featured guests on the Today Show, Larry King Live,
and Geraldo.34: CNN and MSNBC devoted entire programs to the
allegations, and hard news icon Ted Koppel added gravitas to the story
by covering it on Nightline.35 By the time that the next wave of Sunday
talk shows aired, virtually all the major media outlets were pumping out
stories in reliance on a single confidential source who claimed to have
heard part of the tapes, and reporters took turns speculating on a Clinton
resignation or impeachment before any evidence of the misconduct was
independently confirmed by the news organizations who were doing the
prognosticating. 6
Kovach and Rosenstiel concluded that by the end of the first week
of the scandal, forty-one percent of all reportage had not been factual
reporting, but rather journalists' own analysis, opinion, speculation, or
30. WARP SPEED, supra note 19, at 12. Drudge's tip was not totally accurate;
Newsweek didn't kill the story, but delayed it to continue fact-checking. See id at 11.
Also, Drudge accurately characterized the Clinton-Lewinsky relationship only if
several episodes of "oral sex" constituted a "sexual affair," a distinction that came to
be quite significant to the later allegations that Clinton lied under oath. See Harvey
Berkman, If Indicted. Clinton Has Weak Defenses, NAT'L. LAW J., Dec. 7, 1998, at Al.




35. See id. at 14. Drudge's key role in the unfolding Monicagate saga earned him
a spot on Newsweek's list of that year's most influential people in the media, and earned
him his own show on the Fox-TV news channel. See Matt Zoeller Seitz, Media
Coverage Burned the Scandal at Both Ends, NEWORLEANSTIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 14, 1999,
at 14A. After the end of the media interest in Monicagate, Drudge's ratings went down
and his show was canceled. See Fox Cancels Drudge, 18 ELEC. MEDIA, Nov. 22, 1999,
at 28.
36. See WARP SPEED, supra note 19, at 14-15.
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judgments--essentially "commentary and pundrity.,M Another twelve
percent had been reporting attributed to other news organizations and
totally unverified by the outlet repeating it. 38 This explosion began a
stream of inaccuracies and half-truths which for a time were passed on
as the gospel truth, as Kovach and Rosentiel detail.39 They starkly point
out the harm caused by the willingness ofjournalists at tabloids and on
the Internet to publish with scant verification and the adverse effect this
has on the journalistic standards of the mainstream media.'
It is a mistake to view the incredible media circus surrounding
Monicagate as representative of the workaday world of reporting, just
as the coverage of O.J. Simpson's murder trial was atypical for a
criminal case. The coverage of the Atlanta Olympic bombing, however,
provides yet another powerful example of relentless, careless pack
journalism, which caused NBC and CNN to settle lawsuits for substan-
tial sums.4
Local media are also vulnerable to the forces sweeping national
outlets, as the coverage of Richard Jewell by the Atlanta newspapers
underscored.42 The ability of public affairs and news reporting to garner
strong ratings at minimal cost has caused a change in both the nature of
local television reporting (where "if it bleeds it leads" is the credo) and
in the number of hours devoted to news programming, which has
skyrocketed, reaching the estimated 80 million Americans who consider
local TV news their primary information source.43 The next section
37. See id. at 17.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 22-32. For example, both the Dallas Morning News and the Wall Street
Journal incorrectly reported that a witness had testified to a grand jury that he had
actually seen the President and the intern in a "compromising" position in a study near
the Oval office. See id. at 28. This "bombshell" replicated on the Internet so quickly
that by the time Nightline aired that night, ABC reported this development as fact. See
id. at 27. The Morning News ran the story despite the fact that it did not satisfy the
paper's two-source rule, and the other outlets passed along the story without doing any
independent verification. See id. at 28. The next day, the paper retracted its story. See
id. It turned out that the witness instead had testified only that he had seen the
President and the intern in an "ambiguous" situation. See id.
40. See generally Meredith O'Brien, Power Shift, QUILL, May 1, 1999.
41. See Symposium, Panel : ,Accountability ofthe Media in Investigations, 7 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 402 & n.3 (1997).
42. See generally Ann Woolner, Just Doing Our Jobs, BRILL'S CONTENT, Apr. 2000,
at 86 (detailing media coverage of the bombing at the Atlanta Olympics).
43. Carol Guensburg, Taming the Beast, AM. JOURNALISM REV., July 1, 1999, at SI
(reporting that local news typically contains "a heavy dose of violence, a heavy dose
of triviality [and] a tremendous amount of commercials;" deadline pressures are
"constant and intense;" and that "ratings, competition [and) money" affect "almost
everything").
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considers how this changed news environment should impact the
requisite proof of culpability in a libel action.
III. THE CLOCK AND THE COURTS
It has long been established that a false statement published by the
media is protected from the strict liability of the common law of libel by
operation of the First Amendment; the degree of fault that the plaintiff
has to prove depends upon the plaintiff's "status." New York Times v.
Sullivan" and its progeny impose upon public officials and public
figures a daunting burden: proof of "actual malice," that the defendant
published knowing that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard for the truth,' and this must be proven with "convincing
clarity." '47 This is a subjective standard, focusing on state of mind,
asking whether the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts about
the truth of the publication." '48 Examples of the sort of proof of "bad
faith" that satisfy this exacting standard include a defendant who
fabricates the story or who publishes unverified information obtained
from an anonymous source, or if the statements themselves were
published despite being so "inherently improbable" that only a reckless
44. It is unclear whether strict liability applies to claims brought by a private
plaintiff arising out of a statement of purely private concern. See Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that the unique common
law damage rules, which greatly favor plaintiffs in libel actions, did not conflict with
the First Amendment when the defendant's defamatory statement was made about a
private plaintiff, as long as the subject was a matter of "purely private concern"). In
such a context, the state's interest in protecting reputation outweighed the diminished
free speech interests implicated by the subject matter of the speech. See id. at 760-61.
Most commentators have concluded that the Court's rationale in Dun & Bradstreet
regarding damages would lead to an analogous holding that the strict liability of the
common law applies in private plaintiff/matter of private concern cases. See, e.g.,
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:17 (3d ed. 1999). Because, a fortiori,
the media will only publish matter that is of public concern, Dun & Bradstreet is
inapplicable to libel actions brought against the media. See Huggins v. Moore, 726
N.E.2d 456, 460 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that the New York courts defer to editors on the
question of what topics are of public concern).
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. Id. at 279-80.
47. Id. at 285-86. The Court elsewhere has used the phrase "clear and convincing"
evidence. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). Under either
formulation, it is clear that the First Amendment requires a greater quantum of proof
than is required of a plaintiff in a garden-variety civil action, which uses a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:25. The Court
has also construed the First Amendment to require de novo judicial review of jury
findings of actual malice. Id. § 12:83.
48. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
2092000]
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person would put them into circulation.49 Another example from this
limited class of outrageous conduct that supports a libel award for a
public plaintiff is the defendant's willful blindness, a deliberate effort
to avoid the truth, as when a reporter fails to check an obvious and
accessible source.' Neither proof of negligence or even gross negli-
gence is sufficient to support a libel award for a public plaintiff."
When the claim is brought by a private plaintiff, the balance
between the defendant's free speech rights and the state interest in
protecting reputation requires a less speech-protective outcome.
According to the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 2 a private plaintiff
typically lacks access to the media to rebut an attack, so she is more
vulnerable to harm caused by published falsehoods; further, she is more
deserving of protection than a public plaintiff because she has not
assumed the risk of public comment on her affairs. 3 While the Gertz
Court concluded that the common law of strict liability was unaccept-
able for libel actions brought by private plaintiffs (because to "guarantee
the accuracy of factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censor-
ship"),54 it declined to require proof of actual malice." Rather, states
were free to set the degree of culpability necessary to support a private
figure libel action "as long as they do not impose liability without
fault."56 Almost all states have accepted the Court's invitation to let
private plaintiffs recover damages upon a less demanding standard than
actual malice; indeed, the vast majority only require proof of negli-
gence." The next section considers whether self-imposed time
49. id. at 732.
50. See Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,685 (1981).
While a failure to verify is generally not actual malice, in some circumstances it may
support such an inference, as when the reporter fails to ask the key question of source
for fear that it would undermine the story. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, §3:52.
51. See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION 5-59 (3d ed. 1999) ("The
defendant's conduct is not to be judged by a'professional standards rule' the New York
Times standard is not equivalent to or met by a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.") (quoting Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (plurality opinion)). Because the professional standard is
irrelevant to the determination of actual malice, evidence of journalistic custom is
irrelevant in public plaintiff cases. See SACK, supra, § 5.5.2.4.
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
53. Seeid. at344.
54. Id. at 340.
55. Id at 352.
56. Id. at 347. Gertz also restricted the availability of the common law damages
rules that favored plaintiffs, allowing the award ofeither "general" or punitive damages
only upon proof of actual malice. See id at 349-50.
57. See BRUCEW. SANFORD, LIBELAND PRIVACY § 8.3 (2d ed. 1997).
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pressures should shield media defendants from liability for defamatory
misstatements under either the actual malice or negligence regimes.
A. Actual Malice and Time Pressures
The Supreme Court considered the impact of time pressures on libel
actions brought by public plaintiffs in a pair of 1967 decisions which
were consolidated under the name Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts.58
In AssociatedPress v. Walker, a wire service reporter was covering a fast-
breaking news story under what amounted to emergency conditions,
specifically, the efforts of a staunch segregationist (and retired U.S.
Army general) to encourage a volatile crowd to resist the forced
integration of the University of Mississippi by federal officials."' The
companion case of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts involved a very different
journalistic setting: the publication by a magazine of a feature story on
misconduct by a college athletic director, for which the reporter had no
deadline pressure.' The Court was highly fragmented on the central
question of the appropriate standard of culpability to be applied when
the plaintiffs were not "public officials," but instead were "public
figures."6 A clear majority, however, believed that the different
reportorial contexts justified an award for Butts, but not for Walker.62
58. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (consolidated with
Associated Press v. Walker).
59. See id, at 140.
60. See id. at 135, 158.
61. Justice Harlan's opinion proposed that a requirement ofactual malice in public
official claims be rejected and instead urged a less burdensome requirement of"highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible reporters." Id at 155.
This position garnered the support of Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas. See id. at 133.
Chief Justice Warren wrote for himself, and argued for an actual malice standard for
all public plaintiff cases. See id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justices Brennan
and White agreed with the Chief Justice on the appropriate legal standard, but urged
a retrial in front of a properly instructed jury. See id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justices Black and Douglas argued for absolute immunity. See id. at 170
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Read together, a 5-4 majority of the Court
believed that a public figure, like a public official, had to prove actual malice to recover
damages in libel action. This is now recognized as the appropriate standard. See
SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 2:8.
62. Because the Chief Justice incorporated Justice Harlan's discussion of the
record into his own analysis, Justice Harlan's analysis of the time factor should be
treated as if it also reflected the views of a total of seven justices. See Butts, 388 U.S.
at 169-70. Indeed, because the justices who did not specifically endorse Justice
Harlan's evaluation of the record (Justices Black and Douglas) argued for absolute
immunity for journalists, one can presume that they would agree with the other seven
justices on the narrower question of the relevance of deadlines to a finding of actual
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Justice Harlan wrote that "[t]he evidence showed that the Butts story
was in no sense 'hot news' and the editors of the magazine recognized
the need for a thorough investigation of the serious charges."63 The
opinion continued, "In contrast to the Butts article, the dispatch which
concerns us in Walker was news which required immediate dissemina-
tion." Justice Harlan went on to consider the other distinctions
between the cases, including the fact that the story in Walker was based
upon an eyewitness account by the reporter, whose dispatches "gave
every indication of being trustworthy and competent."65 As a result,
only the judgment for Butts was upheld."
Walker and Butts have been read to prevent a finding of actual
malice based upon a reporter's failure to verify facts due to time
pressure.67 This position was justified by Judge Skelly Wright of the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit:
Verification . . . is a time consuming process, a factor especially
significant in the newspaper business where news quickly goes stale,
commentary rapidly becomes irrelevant, and commercial opportunity
in the form of advertisements can easily be lost. In many instances
considerations of time and distance make verification impossible..
.. We should be hesitant to impose responsibilities upon newspapers
which can be met only through costly procedures or through self-
censorship designed to avoid the risks of publishing controversial
material ."
The logic behind the actual malice standard, as well as the policies
promoted by it, are generally consistent with Judge Wright's conclusion.
Actual malice requires proof of subjective awareness of probable falsity,
which necessitates an inquiry into the journalist's state of mind. The
Court has said that "[f]ailure to investigate does not in itself establish
bad faith."'69 So, delaying publication serves only to increase the risk
that the reporter will learn of information that raises doubt about the
accuracy of the report; if she then goes with the story, despite possession
of the conflicting information, she may be guilty of actual malice, and
malice.
63. Id. at 157.
64. Id. at 158.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 161-62.
67. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:55.
68. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968).
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subject to liability.7" By "putting a premium on ignorance," the Court
recognized that it protected the irresponsible journalist who publishes
first and verifies later.7 All journalists operate under some time
pressure," and allowing the media to point to the time pressures
endemic to the 24-hour news cycle further promotes irresponsible
journalism. Nevertheless, unless the Supreme Court revisits the actual
malice issue, and expands the notion of "willful blindness" to include
conscious decisions to rush to print," it is likely that the increasing
tendency of the media to yield to the demands of the 24-hour news cycle
will serve to shield ajournalist from liability for the publication of false
statements made about public plaintiffs.74
B. Negligence and Time Pressures
Because of the decreased free speech interests in reporting on
private plaintiffs, as well as the strong state interest in protecting private
reputation, in almost all jurisdictions a private plaintiff need only prove
negligence in order to secure an award of actual damages in a libel
action.75 Gertz allowed states to decide whether to require proof of
70. See id. at 73 1. See also William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court,
the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 169, 186 ("[B]y making
immediate (inaccurate) coverage relatively cost free, the Court renders more thorough
investigations unnecessary and potentially more risky."). There is also the incongruous
consequence that publications that have a reputation for meticulous fact-checking may
be held to a higher standard of care than tabloids, which tend to shoot first and ask
questions later. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine:
We are aware that this puts publishers like The New Yorker "whose practice
it is to investigate the accuracy of its stories" at a disadvantage compared to
other publishers such as newspapers and supermarket tabloids that cannot or
will not engage in thorough fact-checking. After all, publications that check
their stories.., are more likely to develop "obvious reasons to doubt" than
those that do not.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 901 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992), on remand
from Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (Kozinski, J.).
71. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
72. See SACK, supra note 51, at 5-68 n.397 ("No publication is made without time
pressure or with the ability to ascertain absolutely every statement as anyone who has
written a brief or opinion can attest. Rare, indeed, is the document that is error-free,
irrespective of the relative leisure in which it was composed.").
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. See McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1298, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("The standard of actual malice is a daunting one."). Data collected by the Libel
Defense Resource Center proves how rarely a public plaintiff ever recovers damages.
See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process
in Libel Litigation, 58 O-O ST. L.J. 1753, 1774-79 (1998).
75. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. For similar reasons, various other
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negligence in private plaintiff cases, and it also therefore left open for
common law development two important collateral questions that bear
upon media liability in a world with a 24-hour news cycle: first,
whether a libel action should be treated as a garden variety tort action
or rather as a form of professional malpractice, and, more specifically,
what is the appropriate role of evidence of the industry custom to rush
to release stories. The second question is, under what circumstances
should journalists be able exculpate themselves by claiming that their
story involved the exigent circumstances characteristic of "hot news."
C. The Role of Custom
In the garden-variety negligence action, the jury is the ultimate
evaluator of the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct, in some cases
assisted (but never bound by) expert testimony of what the custom is in
the defendant's trade or profession.76 In contrast, the central question in
a negligence action brought against a professional is whether the
defendant complied with the relevant custom in her profession." For
example, in a medical malpractice action, a failure by the plaintiff to
adduce expert testimony that the physician failed to act in the customary
manner typically guarantees a judgment for the defendant." As a
corollary, the jury is not free in a malpractice action to adopt a
community-based "reasonable person in the circumstances" standard;
rather it must adopt the standard of one of the expert witnesses proffered
by the parties.'
There are several reasons offered for the distinctive doctrines
applicable to negligence actions brought against professionals. First, it
is presumed that laymen are ignorant about the ways of highly-trained
and skilled professionals, sojurors should not be able to substitute their
judgments for that of the relevant professional community." Second,
protections accorded to defendants in public plaintiff cases may not be available in
private plaintiff cases, such as the requirement that there be proof of culpability by
"clear and convincing evidence" and the availability of de novo review ofjury findings
of culpability. The lower courts are split on these issues. See Gilles, supra note 74, at
1772.
76. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRosSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 33,
37 (5th ed. 1984).
77. See id § 32.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. See also Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REv. 549, 608 (1959) (arguing that the malpractice model is appropriate for
professionals because they have "undertaken long years of study to acquire
214 [Vol. 23
THE 24-HOUR NEWS CYCLE
a professional impliedly represents to her client that she will follow
customary methods, and thus it is only fair to expect the actor to provide
the level of care promised.8' Third, there is the likelihood that judges,
engaged in the process of crafting the common law, recognize that the
protections provided to doctors by the malpractice model also redound
to the benefit of fellow lawyers sued for legal malpractice.8 2 Finally,
there is the presumption that the ethos of professionals, for example the
Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, protects the public from the group
responding to pressures to maximize profits by adopting irresponsible
customary practices. 3
This malpractice model has been adopted by a number of states for
private person libel claims," a result urged by the Restatement, which
recommends that ajournalist be evaluated against skill and experience
"normally possessed by members of that profession.""5 This position is
attractive to some because it "fulfills an important role as [an additional]
first amendment buffer zone for the press, ... [and because it takes] into
account the realities of the newsroom.""
Nevertheless, there are a range of reasons why the malpractice
model should be rejected for libel actions brought by private plaintiffs
and for limiting the significance of evidence that a defendant adhered to
a customary practice to publish first and verify later. Most fundamen-
tally, the malpractice model adopts as the standard of care the practices
of a self-interested group of actors, who may well behave in a manner
inconsistent with the public welfare. Prosser recognized the dangers of
allowing defendants to prevail in negligence actions by cleaving to
custom, noting that "[a]n entire industry, by adopting such careless
methods to save time, effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its
knowledge").
81. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 76, § 32.
82. As Prosser noted, "Another explanation [for the malpractice model] is the
healthy respect which the courts have had for the learning of a fellow profession." Id.
83. See Richard N. Pearson, The Role ofCustom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND.
L.J. 528,536-37(1976). Many commentators are skeptical about whether professionals
are sufficiently disinterested to justify the protection provided by the malpractice
model. See, e.g., Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical
Jurisprudence ofMedicalMalpractice, 1992 WIsc. L. REV. 1193, 1213 ("With professional
custom as the standard, the nation's physicians may lawfully adopt and follow practices
that are patently negligent... under the standard of ordinary care to which all others
are held. The medical community is answerable not for want of care but for want of
conformity.").
84. See SMOUA, supra note 44, § 3:89.
85. REsTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTs, § 580B cmt. g (1977).
86. SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:122.
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own uncontrolled standard." ' As pointed out above,8 there are many
examples of the media responding to the intensely competitive
atmosphere created by the 24-hour news cycle, by rushing to publish
reports, recycling rumors, and the like. Such profit-driven, self-
interested behavior is more likely to be excused under the malpractice
model, even though the public interest in careful journalism is at its
zenith in the context of possible false reports that damage the reputa-
tions of private individuals.8 9
Further, allowing a group of actors to defeat negligence actions by
pointing to their compliance with their own industry's customs
undercuts incentives to make progress in the direction of safety.9 °
Whether the primary goal of the negligence system is to deter unreason-
ably dangerous behavior,9' to encourage the optimal allocation of
society's scarce resources,92 or to facilitate corrective justice, 93 market-
driven forces should not be allowed to trump other legitimate public
interests, as is often the result under a malpractice regime.94 As libel
scholar Rod Smolla points out, there is a real danger associated with
journalists racing to the bottom: "[b]ecause the professional model
invites the members of the profession to set their own standards of care,
there is the concern that the whole industry will collectively downgrade
its officially recognized principles of conduct."95  Thus, allowing a
87. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 76, § 33.
88. See supra notes 30-39, and accompanying text.
89. See also Marshall & Gilles, supra note 70, at 186-87 (arguing that the current
state of the law sends the message to the press that "if it covers immediate events, it
will enjoy the benefit of a more lenient standard of review," which in turn promotes
"superficial reporting to the detriment of serious investigation").
90. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 76, § 33.
91. See id. § 3.
92. See WiLLiAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 1 (1987).
93. See Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justification for Jury Adjudiction, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
94. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1382, 1388 (1994) ("Homogeneity of knowledge, resources, and attitudes toward risk
helps generate custom, but these factors do not necessarily ensure that such customs
will represent the kind of socially optimal responses to risk to which courts should
defer."); see also PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 142-43 (1985) (discussing how customary care is not necessarily socially
optimal care in the medical malpractice context).
95. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:126. See also David A. Anderson, Libel and
Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 455 (1975) (arguing that the malpractice
model "discriminate[s] unjustifiably against media or outlets whose philosophies and
methods deviate from those of the mainstream").
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journalist defendant in a libel action to excuse inaccurate reporting by
pointing to evidence of the journalistic custom to get the story first,
whether or not the story is right, serves to encourage careless reporting.
In addition, the malpractice model isjustified only to the extent that
the group in question shares the essential characteristics of a profession:
substantial formal training; self-regulation (often in the form of
licensing); the provision of services, the quality of which the client
cannot adequately evaluate; and, the obligation to sublimate self-interest
to the common good. As I have pointed out elsewhere,96 journalism
lacks most, if not all, of these characteristics.
Another difficulty created by the malpractice model for libel actions
is the proliferation of standards. By analogy to medical malpractice,
would the defendant be compared to ajournalist in the "same or similar
locality?" Should there be different standards for a news anchor and the
journalist working in the field? The tabloid or the somber political
journal? This "tricky business of establishing a defendant standard,"9"
and the concomitant proliferation of standards, is inconsistent with the
general tort goal of evaluating all actors by an objective, external
standard."
Similarly, unlike the circumstance presented by a claim that a
physician negligently performed surgery or some other complex medical
procedure, juries are not so lacking in knowledge as to be unable to
competently evaluate the care exercised by journalists." As one court
observed, "[t]he elementary standards of basic news reporting are
common knowledge. News articles and broadcasts must contain the
answers to the essential inquiries of who, what, where, when, why and
how."" Additionally, as in the case of medical malpractice, the
centrality of expert testimony to a professional negligence action could
unfairly handicap libel plaintiffs who have difficulty enlisting the
services of an expert due to the "conspiracy of silence;"'' even if a
plaintiff is able to locate and pay for a qualified expert, there is the risk
that the jury would be unduly impressed by the testimony of a deep-
pocket defendant's expert.
02
96. See Logan, supra note 16, at 157-59.
97. SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:123.
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 76, § 32.
99. See Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 34,660 S.W.2d 933,
938 (1983); Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 656 P.2d 79, 83 (Haw. 1982).
100. Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 998 (1979). See also Schrottman
v. Barnicle, 437 N.E.2d 205, 214 (Mass. 1982).
101. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, § 3:126.
102. See Phillip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
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For of all these reasons, courts should take steps to limit the
influence of evidence that a journalist complied with the industry
custom by rushing to publish a story about a private plaintiff. At a
minimum, the medical malpractice model that makes a defendant's
compliance with industry custom conclusive on the due care issue
should be rejected. °3 Similarly, the libel plaintiff should never be
burdened by a requirement to adduce expert testimony on the defen-
dant's non-compliance with journalistic custom. Furthermore, the trial
judge should retain the right to strike evidence of compliance with
custom in those presumably rare circumstances when such conduct was
patently unreasonable or when the defendant proceeded to act knowing
full well ofthe dangers created by adherence to custom."° Finally, even
if evidence of the defendant's compliance with journalistic custom is
admissible, the trial judge should be sure to carefully instruct the jury
that such evidence is only "some evidence" of reasonable care, and that
they are the ultimate arbiters of that issue.'
D. Journalistic "Emergencies"
The central question in a negligence action is always: did the
defendant engage in conduct that created an unreasonable risk of harm
in the circumstances.'0° As a result, less care is expected from a defen-
dant who fires a gun in the woods than one who fires an identical gun,
at an identical time, but in the city."~ A similar concern with the context
in which a defendant acted is recognized in libel law.'
One result of this focus on the circumstances in which a defendant
acts is the "emergency doctrine:" a defendant who is confronted by an
emergency is not expected to exercise the same amount of care as is a
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1312 (1999).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. g (1977).
104. See Donald E. Kacmar, The Impact of Computerized Medical Literature Databases
on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Time for Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up Call, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 635-39 (1997) (discussing circumstances in which courts have
refused to allow a jury verdict for a physician despite evidence of compliance with
medical custom).
105. See, e.g., Darrell L. Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas Medical Malpractice
Cases, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 75 (1991).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 282-83 (1977).
107. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv.
1369, 1398 (1994).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. h (1977) ("The standard of
care does not change, but its application may vary with the circumstances.").
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defendant not facing exigent circumstances.'0 But this rule has
important limitations, relevant to time pressures self-imposed by
journalists. The defendant's conduct in an emergency is evaluated
under a less demanding standard only when the emergency was sudden
and unexpected, such as to deprive the actor of reasonable opportunity
to deliberate."' Similarly, the emergency cannot be of the defendant's
own making, on the view that the defendant should not be able to
"shield himself behind a situation resulting from his own fault.""'
Thus, a journalist should not be able to bootstrap from a self-imposed
deadline to a conclusion that less care was appropriate because of the
deadline." 2
A final, related problem involves the assertion by a journalist that
she needed to publish without further verification because the story
involved "hot news." As pointed out earlier, the United States Supreme
Court held that there was no actual malice in the "hot news" context
facing the journalist in Walker,"3 and lower courts have often allowed
deadline pressures to shield a journalist from a finding of actual
malice." 4 Journalists have been given a similar dispensation in private
plaintiff/negligence cases."'
109. See KEETONETAL., supra note 76, § 76.
110. Seeid. §33.
Ill. See id. § 33. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1977)
(noting that a defendant must "give impartial consideration to the harm likely to be
done [to] the interests of the other as compared to the advantages likely to accrue to his
own interests, free from the natural tendency of the actor, as a party concerned, to
prefer his own interests to those of others").
112. It is also important to keep in mind that participants in many activities need
special training so that they are equipped to cope with dangerous situations associated
with those activities. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 296 cmt. c (1977). See also
Downs v. United States, 52 F.2d 990, 1002 (6th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he extent to which an
actor will be excused for errors in judgment under [emergency] circumstances is
qualified by the training and experience he may have, or be expected to have, in coping
with the danger or emergency with which he is confronted."). Indeed, it is well-settled
that physicians, by the very nature of their work, should expect emergencies, and be
trained and behave accordingly. See Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape
of Health Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 52-53 (1993).
By the same token, journalists should be expected to anticipate the press of deadlines,
and build into the reportorial process a reasonable degree of concern for the difficulty
of fact-checking under pressure.
113. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. See SMoLLA, supra note 44, §§ 3:75-76.
115. See id. § 3:111. See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media
Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247, 267-70, 359-60 (1985); Hugh J.
O'Halloran, Comment, Journalistic Malpractice: The Need for a Professional Standard of
Care in Defamation Cases, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 86-89 (1988).
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Nevertheless, a journalist's self-serving assertion that a particular
story is "hot news" should not be treated as an abracadabra to which
courts must defer. Just as courts will scrutinize a defendant's argument
that under the First Amendment a particular libel plaintiff is a public
figure (and therefore must prove actual malice),"6 courts should
consider whether the asserted deadline pressure was bona fide. For
example, was the subject of the report in fact "a matter of topical news
requiring prompt publication to be useful?""' 7 Relevant to this inquiry
is the type of publication involved: a broadcaster or other purveyor of
current events may more credibly claim deadline pressures than a
magazine, as may the evening news program rather than the documen-
tary." 8 Also relevant should be the type of item involved: was it a news
headline as opposed to a feature story? In short, courts must be vigilant
to rebuff unjustified efforts by the media to transform every reportorial
context into "hot news.""19
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided the media a large measure of
protection from liability for the publication of false statements,
especially in the context of claims brought by public figures, but also in
the private plaintiff context. Against this backdrop, the recent appear-
ance of the 24-hour news cycle increases the risk that the roll call of the
innocent victims of press calumny will be lengthening at warp speed
unless legal doctrine adjusts to this new journalistic landscape. The
press provides a vital public service but it also can do great harm if
culpable misconduct results in the publication of a false and defamatory
statement. The courts should be no more tolerant of ajournalist rushing
to publish a story without adequate verification than they are of a
116. See SMOLLA, supra note 44, §§ 2:11-19 (discussing Supreme Court decisions
rejecting media efforts to characterize plaintiffs as public figures).
11 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. h. See also Hunt v. Liberty
Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 643 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("[Hlot news" is information that "must be
printed immediately or it will lose its newsworthy value."). But see Tom Rosenstiel,
The Myth of CNN, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1994, at 33 (arguing that all "breaking news"
is not "hot news").
118. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1969)
("The need for constitutional protection in the circumstances [of 'hot news'] is much
more apparent than in the cases of the so-called documentaries or feature stories where
time is available to attempt to verify questionable material.").
119. See Bloom, supra note 115, at 360 ("Finally, deadline pressures must be
attributable to the exigences of the news itself and not simply the predilections of the
publisher.").
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pharmaceutical company that rushes a new drug to market without
adequate testing.

